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The landscape of current philosophy of mind in Poland is varied and 
reflects most of the contemporary international trends in the 
subdiscipline. Its health can be easily seen by the amount of institutional 
backing it gets (various cognitive studies courses across the country) and 
the existence of specialized journals (for example Avant and Studia z 
kognitywistyki i filozofii umysłu). For this reason, we decide to focus 
mostly on one specific group of contemporary trends visible in the 
subdiscipline: the recent resurgence of various forms of internalism and 
the critical reception of this resurgence. Let us briefly outline the 
phenomenon in question. There are no doubts that at the end of XX 
century both: philosophy of mind as well as philosophy of language made 
a very distinct turn towards externalism. Even though classic arguments 
of Hilary Putnam (1975), Saul Kripke (1972), and Tyler Burge (1979) 
concerned linguistic (as opposed to mental)1 content the upshot of the 
discussions they spawned made a great impact on philosophy of mind. 
One of the most visible results of this externalist tendency is the idea of 
embedded and extended cognition. According to the former, cognitive 
content is the result of an interplay between the cognitive agent and its 
environment. The relations between the agent and its environment are 
understood to be so crucial that the identity conditions of mental 
contents is oftentimes construed as dependent on the surroundings of 
the agent (similarly to how the environment was determinant for 
linguistic content in Putnam/Kripke’s theory). The latter idea (the notion 
                                                     
1 See Grabarczyk 2016 for a review of different understandings of „linguistic content” 
and „mental content”.  
Paweł Grabarczyk, Dawid Misztal 
Introduction: Trends in Contemporary Polish Philosophy of Mind 
[ii] 
of extended cognition) points out to the fact that not only the mental 
content but also the operations performed on this content can 
sometimes be delegated to external factors. What is even more 
important, the notion of mental content (or mental representations) 
started to be automatically understood in externalist terms as for several 
authors content has to be understood as relating to some external object, 
property, or event and the idea of mental content devoid of external 
targets seems to be almost self-contradictory (Kriegel 2008). It is in 
many ways fascinating to see how quickly externalism changed from a 
new and radical approach to the dominant perspective.  
As is often the case, this dominant position resulted in a void 
which could then inspire a new wave of more sophisticated takes on 
internalism – new reasons to “turn inside”. Of course, the theories 
characterized as such do not have to self-identify as “internalistic” or 
refer to internalism, but they do retain the main aspect of it: they create 
a space in which notions important for cognition can be defined without 
the appeal to external environment of the cognitive agent. Let us list 
some of such approaches that are relevant for the papers included in this 
volume and characterize them briefly.  
The first notion that internalistic philosophy of mind often 
appeals to is the notion of computation. The reason for it is that it seems 
to be possible (at least in principle) to construe computation as a purely 
internal set of operations that is devoid of any external targets (it is, of 
course, still perfectly possible for elements of computations to refer to 
internal states of the computing machine). If it is possible to specify 
computations regardless of their target or application (in other words, if 
the identity criteria of computations do not demand us to refer to 
external objects), and if the notion of computation is relevant for 
cognition (which is, of course, a contentious claim in and of itself), then 
there still is some hope left for internalism in philosophy of mind. One 
specific subset of computations that (according to some authors) is 
especially relevant for cognition is the inferential subset of computations 
performed by the system (this inferentialist approach to cognition is 
especially evident in the classic example of Ned Block’s theory of narrow 
mental content (Block 1987)).  
Another important notion that creates space for contemporary 
internalism is the idea of structural representations championed by 
Cummins (1989) and revived lately in Ramsey (2007). In short, the idea 
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of structural representations boils down to the fact that some internal 
structures of the cognitive agent relate to their targets due to the fact that 
their structure is homomorphic to the target’s structure. On the face of it, 
this idea is fully externalist (as the structure in question is specified by 
appeal to the target) but the trick is that it allows for a fully internalistic 
reading, because one of the characteristic aspects of structural 
representations is that they can be processed by the system off-line. For 
this reason, it is possible to imagine a situation in which a given system 
entertains and modifies a given representation to a point in which it loses 
the connection with its target (but still has some cognitive value).   
The list of new internalistic ideas and trends in contemporary 
philosophy of mind wouldn’t be complete if we did not mention the 
theory of predictive coding and the interrelated understanding of minds 
as anticipatory mechanisms (Hohwy 2013, Clark 2016). Contrary to 
traditional views on mind, which saw it as passive receiver and 
categorizer of stimuli, these theories interpret the mind as constantly 
constructing the reality. According to this view, the reality we live in is 
more similar to a simulation or conscious hallucination than to reality 
(understood in an old-fashioned sense). We could say that we literally 
live in a bubble and use the connections with our surroundings as “reality 
checks” – signals which help us correct and modify our predictions. 
Minds do not interact with reality, they live in self-constructed models of 
it. It is not hard to see that this radical idea (which has been in many 
respects anticipated by Metzinger 2009) gives hope to internalists as it 
relegates the role of cognitive system’s environment to that of a 
pragmatic “checkpoint” needed only to steer our cognition in the right 
direction (but not to shape it).  
 
*** 
 
Papers collected in this volume relate (directly or indirectly) to these 
“inward” trends of modern philosophy of mind. In a paper entitled “The 
false dichotomy between causal realization and semantic computation”, 
Marcin Miłkowski shows that mechanistic understanding of 
computation does not prevent us from semantic considerations. As he 
points out (following Bechtel 2009), “computational modeling is not just 
about ‘turning inside’. It requires looking up, down, and around”. 
Miłkowski does not prevent computations to be devoid of meaning – on 
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the contrary, he admits that there definitely are examples of computation 
which are not semantic (in other words, the ideas of semantic content 
and mechanistic computation are logically independent). Still, it should 
be pointed out that being logically independent does not mean that there 
are no significant relations between mechanistic computations and 
semantic content. To the contrary – if present, semantic aspects 
constitute constraints on computation. In this sense Miłkowski shows 
that computational theories of cognition (specifically mechanistic ones) 
are in fact agnostic when it comes to the difference between internalistic 
and externalistic interpretations of cognition. One of the advantages of 
this paper is that it clearly differentiates between the social and 
environmental factors that could influence internal computation of a 
cognitive system (a difference that is well known but, sadly, often 
conflated). Miłkowski shows this on a very convincing example proposed 
by Shagrir (2006) in which the internal states of a machine can be 
interpreted as a conjunction or as a disjunction, depending on the social 
practices that surround it.  
A similar line of argumentation can be found in Paweł 
Gładziejewski’s paper “Just how conservative is conservative Predictive 
Processing?”. Gładziejewski looks at the theory of predictive coding and 
shows that, contrary to what may seem to be the case at the first glance, 
this theory does not have to clash with the ideas of 4E cognition 
(embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive). Similarly to what 
Miłkowski does for mechanistic computationalism, Gładziejewski argues 
that the theory of predictive coding can be seen as agnostic in the sense 
that it is possible to interpret it as compatible with externalism. This idea 
is novel, since, as Gładziejewski points out, predictive coding “was 
initially construed in a manner that dovetails with traditional 
approaches in cognitive science, i.e. ones that see cognition as matter of 
inferential, exclusively intracranial processes involving richly structured 
representational states” (he calls it “conservative” or “radical” reading). 
One of the reasons why this conclusion is possible is that, as 
Gładziejewski points out, the notion of “inference” used in the theory of 
predictive coding is very liberal and differs from strict understanding 
proposed by Friston (2013). Specifically, the inferences proponents of 
predictive coding talk about should be truth preserving (which obviously 
ties the cognitive system with its surroundings). In addition to this, 
Gładziejewski shows that the methods the theory of predictive coding 
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uses to delineate internal and external processes do not suffice for such 
a demarcation. Last but not least, what the paper explains is that the type 
of representationalism that predictive coding appeals to has necessary 
ties to environment and to the surrounding social practices.  
To complement the new forms of internalism (and their critical 
adoption), it is also good to look back at the original externalist’s 
argumentation and reevaluate it from contemporary point of view. This 
task is taken by Witold Hensel in a paper entitled “Watered Down 
Essences and Evasive Speech Communities. Two Objections to Putnam’s 
Twin Earth Argument”. Hensel analyzes the seminal Twin-Earth thought 
experiment and shows that it rests on two necessary assumptions which 
are very hard to accept in the light of contemporary science. The first 
assumption is that objects referred to by a given natural-kind name 
contain common micro-structures (microessentialism). As pointed out 
by Hensel, this assumption is not corroborated by contemporary science 
(neither biology nor chemistry). The second, less obvious assumption 
Putnam makes is that it is possible to delineate different communities 
(and thus the intended reference of the terms they use). The problem can 
be presented as follows: Putnam helped us realize that all natural-kind 
terms have a hidden indexical component that ties them to a given 
environment. For example – the term “water” used by inhabitants of 
Earth was always used as referring to the microstructure of a specific 
liquid found on Earth. But why should we treat linguistic communities of 
Earth and Twin-Earth as separate? It is not obvious why should the 
boundary be put in this particular place, but this ability seems to be 
presumed in Putnam’s argumentation.  
An interesting illustrations of the tension between external and 
internal perspective can also be seen in the papers of other authors. 
Katarzyna Kobos discusses the situations when perception occurs in the 
absence of sensory stimuli. Can we say we actually perceive anything in 
such circumstances? Can silence be said to be heard or darkness to be 
seen? What is the role of the brain (if any) in forming of sensory 
experience? To what extent the latter is dependent on external input? In 
her attempt to answer these questions, Kobos meticulously analyzes two 
models of perceptual response to the absence of sensory impingement. 
Consequently, she turns to embodied predictionism as it seems to be 
more theoretically satisfying and more promising in terms of its 
explanatory power.  
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 Marek Prokopski brings our attention to the problem of other 
minds. The author is mainly interested in the conceptual formulation of 
said problem (as opposed to ontological and epistemological 
formulations) which poses the question of possibility of universal mental 
concepts describing emotional states or inner experience. In other 
words, can we – asks Prokopski – justifiably use the mental concept of – 
say – pain, based on personal experience of pain, not only in the first 
person but also in third person cases? The challenge here, according to 
the author, is “to develop plausible positive account of mental concepts”, 
since the negative one would lead to the disputable conclusion that we 
have two different mental dictionaries: a first-personal and a third-
personal. 
As it is often the case with opposing theoretical proposals, 
however incompatible they may seem, they may be inspirational for 
searching possible ways to reconcile them. Przemysław Nowakowski’s 
interesting attempt to integrate computational and embodied approach 
to cognition can be read precisely in this context. However, to achieve his 
goal the author adopts an interalist rather than externalist perspective 
on the evolution of cognition. He assumes that internal complexity of 
organism is at least equally important in evolutionary shaping of 
cognitive processes as external, environmental factors. On this basis, 
Nowakowski presents his own approach to embodied cognition which 
he dubs E-codes’ approach (E-codes being “Efficient, robust and body-
specific processing”). And what he hopes to obtain by means of this 
approach is to create an opportunity for developing conceptualizations 
that would do justice not only to the embodiment thesis but to empirical 
data as well. Although, as he cautiously remarks, that would require 
“more comparative meta-analysis and computational modeling than 
psychological experiments”. 
 The debate between internalism and externalism is continued in 
the next two chapters. In the first one by Krystyna Bielecka, this 
opposition is thoroughly examined in the context of the problem of 
intentionality, and the focus is on the semantic internalism as a potential 
solution to this problem. Analyzing the notion of narrow content (which 
basically means a content limited to its functional role within the 
cognitive system) in its radical interpretations, the author presents 
detailed critique of the aforementioned stance. In her opinion, semantic 
internalism deprives the content of any other than formal (i.e. syntactic) 
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properties, and thus it renders ascribing truth to representations (or any 
other semantic property for that matter) impossible.  
 The anti-internalistic tone of Bielecka’s text is seemingly further 
reinforced in the last section of our book in which Maria Matuszkiewicz 
offers her exhaustive discussion of Robert Stalnaker’s work entitled Our 
Knowledge of the Internal World (2008). The chapter identifies and 
elaborates the central issues of Stalnaker’s argument such as our 
epistemic relation to our experience, the relation between experience 
and knowledge, or the relation between objective knowledge and the 
knowledge we can have only from a certain perspective. But 
Matuszkiewicz not only fully exposes Stalnaker’s version of externalism, 
pointing additionally to its affinity with other philosophical positions 
(with contextualism, for example). She also notices that Stalnaker’s 
externalism, being rather a methodological perspective than 
metaphysical view, is not altogether so anti-internalistic as it may seem 
at first glance.  
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